Napoleon’s naval Waterloo. The Royal Navy, under the command of Admiral Nelson, corners the combined fleets of France and Spain. In the greatest battle between ships of sail, the French and Spanish are destroyed, along with Napoleon’s hopes of invading England.

Of all Napoleon’s foes, the British alone remained undefeated and implacable in their opposition. Unlike his other enemies, who he was able to meet in open battle, the English were protected by the English Channel and the Royal Navy. As a naval victory alone would not subdue them, he needed to defeat the British on land and on their own soil as he had done the Austrians and Prussians. To do this, the British navy had to be distracted or defeated to allow his army to cross the channel.

With the establishment of the third alliance, between Britain, Austria and Russia, Napoleon’s priority shifted from defeating the British to avoiding defeat by her new allies. Instead of covering his invasion force, his navy was required in the Mediterranean to protect his forces in Italy by preventing the British and Russian armies joining and attacking from his rear. On 14th September, he ordered Admiral Villeneuve to pass through the Straights of Gibraltar, link with the Spanish squadron in Cartagen, and head for Naples to block any attempt by the British to land their army currently in Malta.

A Comparison Of Fleets
The British had kept the French and Spanish fleets separated and locked in port. Of the ships of the line available to Napoleon, 35 French and 25 Spanish; about one third were in the Mediterranean. In 1803, the British had 111 ships, of which 60 could be used in home waters and the Mediterranean. The rest were spread throughout the West Indies, North America, India and the East Indies to protect British interests. Of the remainder, many were dispersed on blockade duty. In 1805, 12 were stationed off Brest, six at Ferrol, 11 at Toulon and five at Texel to keep an eye on the Dutch. There was an additional reserve, six in Kent and five at Plymouth. As a generalization, the French and Spanish ships could be viewed as more strongly built and more heavily gunned than those of the British but they were blockaded in port and in various states of disrepair, many unseaworthy.

The French revolution had decimated the officer corps of the French navy. Most officers were revolutionary appointees, inexperienced in command and lacking in ability while the rank and file was no better. In 1793, the Corps of seaman had been disbanded and army soldiers had to be used to fight on board ships rather than sailors and marines. The Spanish were in even worse shape, the French admiral Villeneuve describing them as “herdsmen and beggars.” The allied navies were, therefore, inexperienced at naval warfare and unskilled at ship handling.

On the other hand, most English officers had been in battle. Sailors were mostly either volunteers or had been pressed into service from the maritime community. As a merchant ship sails the same way as a warship, they were experienced at ship handling and gave the British a distinct advantage in maneuverability. More importantly, most had seen action and experienced success. This resulted in confidence and an expectation of victory that the French lacked.

A Comparison Of Tactics
British commanders tended to favor placing their ships to the windward of their enemy whereas the French tended to prefer the leeward. This gave the more aggressive British commander greater maneuverability and the ability to choose the moment of attack whereas his French opponent was forced to wait for the move and react accordingly. While the leeward ship had the ability to slip away more easily if the battle became too hot, it was a tactic aimed more at survival than victory.

French tactical thinking felt that the best way to defeat a ship was to destroy its means of maneuvering. As such, the French tended to concentrate their fire on the masts and rigging of their opponents. The British, on the other hand, saw killing the enemy ship’s crew as the preferred tactic and therefore concentrated fire into the hull. Due to the strength in design of warships of the day, they were rarely sunk by enemy fire but casualties could be very high. This, and the British ability to fire at a faster rate, helps to understand why French and Spanish losses tended to be so much higher than those of the British.

Fleet actions of the period had tended to be inconclusive. As a fleet closed on another to attack, a ship in line only knew when to turn into attack when its predecessor did. This resulted in a sequential attack where the battle developed piecemeal. This, together with the French tactic of sailing to the leeward, allowed them to easily escape. The only way to overcome this would be to approach line abreast and attempt to rake the enemy. This was, however, a risky tactic as it exposed the weaker bows to the enemy and masked the broadside. As a man-of-wars armament was placed in its sides, when approaching head on, it was unable to return fire. The attacking ship or fleet could be crippled before it was even able to make contact. If the fleet broke through the others line, it would then be forced to reform to the enemy’s leeward side.1. Only a brave and confident commander would use such a tactic and it was a modification of this that Nelson intended to use against Villeneuve.

The British Commanders
Admirals Nelson and Collingwood
Nelson Collingwood

On 9th October, Nelson called his captains aboard to explain his plan of battle. The British were to approach the French/Spanish in two independent lines, the weather column led by himself in Victory and Admiral Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign commanding the lee column. His own column was to break the French line just ahead of the enemies commander in chief, presumed to be at the center of the line while Collingwood’s division was to attack 12 ships from the end of the line. This would isolate up to 20 of the enemies ships in the van giving the British a local superiority of numbers to the rear, allowing them to envelop and defeat the rear of the enemy before the van could turn and render assistance. The British could then reform to meet this new threat or give chase if the van decided to run. As the leading ships in each of his columns would be surrounded by enemies and isolated from help as they broke the enemy’s line, Nelson placed his most powerful three deckers in the van to concentrate his firepower. Such a plan of close fighting favored the British emphasis of firing into the hull and their higher rates of fire.

Interestingly, Nelson’s opposite number, Villeneuve, predicted that Nelson would take such a course of action:
“The enemy will not confine himself to forming into a line of battle parallel with our own and engaging us in an artillery duel… he will endeavor to envelope our rear, to break through our line and to direct his ships in groups such that ours such as he shall have cut off, so as to surround and defeat them.”

Admiral Villeneuve
Villeneuve

To overcome this tactic, there were a number of possible counters that could be employed. The French/ Spanish could wear together and reverse their direction as the British approached so that the rear of the line became the van. This would cause the British columns to hit the front of the line. Instead of concentrating on the rear and isolating the van as it sailed away in the wrong direction, the rear ships would sail up to the action and be able to quickly join the battle. Alternatively, the French could fire their broadsides into the approaching British and then bear up and run to leeward to avoid being raked as the British reached their line. The tactic decided on was of “equalizing the line.” Believing that Nelson had only 20 ships of the line at his disposal, Villeneuve intended to form a “Corps de bataille” of that number and the rest into an “Escadre d’observation” as a reserve to meet the enemy where he chose to concentrate. In reality, however, this formation couldn’t be effectively implemented due to the poor sailing ability of his crews. On sighting the British on the 21st, he saw that the British had more than 20 ships and that his “Corp de bataille” was outnumbered. He was forced to place his reserve in the van forming one long unwieldy line – the worst formation in which to meet the British.

In a council of war, Villeneuve’s Spanish commanders refused to set sail knowing that Nelson and the British fleet were waiting for them. Napoleon, expecting Villeneuve to avoid carrying out his orders, dispatched Vice Admiral Francois Rosily to relieve him of command. On hearing of this and that on the 18th, the British had sent a fleet of four ships of the line to escort a convoy to Malta, Villeneuve convinced his commanders to set sail.

At 7am on 19th October 1805, the British frigate Sirius raised signal no. 370, “The enemy’s ships are coming out of port or getting under sail.” This was in turn passed to the frigates Euryalus, to Phoebe, to Niad and onto the ships of the line Defense, Colossus and Mars. By 9.30, Nelson has the message and ordered a “general chase southeast” towards the Straights of Gibraltar. Due to a drop in the wind and poor seamanship, only eight of Villeneuve’s ships managed to clear harbor and it wasn’t until noon the next day that all 33 had cleared port. This, and Nelson’s quick response, resulted in his fleet arriving at the Straights well before the allies and forcing him to backtrack towards Cadiz. Villeneuve, in the meantime, sailed into the Atlantic towards the out of sight Nelson who kept watch with his frigates.

Dawn on the 21st saw the allied fleet approach the Straights to find it blocked by the British. At 6.00 Nelson hoisted signal no. 13, “Prepare for battle”. Those ships which had not already done so, set about the task. On a 19th century man-of-war, this was a major undertaking. Wherever possible, rigging was duplicated and strengthened to prevent yards from being shot away and falling to deck and the tiller was strengthened to preserve the ability to maneuver. Damage control equipment was prepared to plug holes below the waterline and buckets were filled with water for firefighting. Anything loose such as tables, furniture and even livestock was either stowed below or thrown overboard and hand weapons were placed around deck where they could easily be reached. Magazines were prepared and the deck was doused in water and covered with sand to provide better grip and soak up blood. Finally the galley fire was doused. Grog was issued with the cold meals eaten before the battle to help fight nerves.

At 7.30, Villeneuve ordered a retreat to the north. He ordered the easier option of turning down wind rather than tacking into it but it still proved too much for his fleet who milled about for 1 1/2 hours trying to reform while the British, using all possible sail, closed to attack. Instead of using fighting sail, they utilized every bit of canvas in order to maximize their speed and minimize the amount of time that the enemy was able to fire on them while they were unable to reply. The British were aided by a heavy swell which had caused the Allied line to lose its formation, opening gaps through which they could break. The allied crews, for many of whom this was their first time out of port, proved unable to keep close formation in the conditions. The British, on the other hand, with years of experience, were better able to keep station.